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ABSTRACT 
Corporate governance (CG) has received much attention in the current studies all over 
the world especially after many corporate scandals and the failures of some biggest 
firms around the world such as Commerce Bank (1991) Enron (2001), Adelphia 
(2002), and World Com (2002). 
The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between board mechanisms (audit 
committee size, audit committee composition, board size, and board composition) and 
firm performance (ROA) based on the annual reports of listed companies in the year 
2011 of  sample of non-financial firms in the Saudi Market (Tadawul). For the 
purpose of this study, data was collected from a sample of 102 non-financial listed 
companies.  
Furthermore, an analysis of regression analysis is utilized to examine the relationship 
between board characteristics and firm performance.The results of this study reveal 
that audit committee size, audit committee composition and board size have no effect 
on firm performance in the selected sample while board composition has a significant 
negative relationship with firm performance. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Corporate governance (CG) has received much attention in the current studies all over 
the world especially after many corporate scandals and the failures of some biggest 
firms around the world such as Commerce Bank (1991) Enron (2001), Adelphia 
(2002), and World Com (2002). Practically, transparency and accountability became 
needed for attracting investors and capital funds on one hand, and for financial 
security and stability on the other hand. As the environment business has become very 
competitive, the uncertainty and risk are the main characteristics for today’s business. 
Under this modern environment, it became very difficult to predict and control the 
factors that affect the performance of the firms (Kuratko & Morris, 2003). Good CG 
practice could be one of the best solutions to reduce the uncertainty and the risk in the 
current business environment. Furthermore, it could attract investment capital as a 
result of reducing the risk level. 
In fact, the subject of CG is practically very important. Even in developed markets, 
there is a great debate on how bad or good the current CG mechanisms are (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). Hence, many international organizations in the world such as the 
International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) and the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have also developed guidelines for 
CG. The OECD issued a guidance publication for better corporate governance titled 
“Principles of Corporate Governance” in 1998 and reviewed it in 2004. These 
principles focus on the performance of long-term economics and enhancement the 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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